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FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO UNEMPLOYMENT 
EMPLOYMENT TO EMPLOYMENT? 
W .C. Ultee, J. Dessens, and W. Jansen 
1 Introduction 
FROM 
This contribution addresses two questions on unequal outcomes of 
competitions for jobs between employed and unemployed persons over 
shorter and longer periods for sixteen western industrial nations at the 
end of the seventies and in the early eighties. The first question is 
whether, if the general level of unemployment in a country is higher, 
outcomes of contests for jobs are more strongly disadvantageous for 
those already unemployed, and whether, if the rise in a country's 
unemployment during a certain period is larger, for persons already 
unemployed the unfavorable competitive results during that period 
increase too. The second questk·n is whether in nations where large-
scale dismissals legally are more difficult, disadvantages for those 
already unemployed are larger, and whether these inequalities also are 
enhanced by a temporally slower decline of unemployment benefits 
of some general social minimum. 
These two specific questions may be viewed as parts of a more 
general one on stratification and mobility in western industrial nations 
under condition of persistently high unemployment. In public debates 
in western industrial nations different' key words are suggestive of 
these consequences. Dahrendorf (1984) stripped the term underclass of 
its U.S. connotations and applied it to Western Europe. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany the term "a twothird society" was coined, in 
France "the new poor" have emerged, the Netherlands has "the class of 
written offs", and the United Kingdom displays a north-south divide. 
With unemployment at a persistently high level, is a new class arising 
at the margin of society, a category of persons that are unemployed and 
tend to stay unemployed, whereas employed persons tend to keep jobs? 
This contribution seeks to answer its two specific questions about 
social consequences of persistently high unemployment by 
approximating tables cross-classifying for a country an inhabitant's 
employment or unemployment at the beginning of a (shorter or longer) 
period by this person's employment or unemployment at the end of this 
period. These tables are obtained by combining stock data for the labor 
force and for unemployment in a country with data about duration of 
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unemployment. These data were taken from official statistical 
publications for western industrial nations. These publications 
contained results of labor force surveys or totals from registers of labor 
exchanges or social security agencies. Time series for sixteen countries 
were obtained. These countries were Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the Irish' 
Republic, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. For each country there are 
several tables pertaining to periods of differing length at the end of the 
seventies and in the early eighties. 
The next section connects this chapter's questions with those on 
intergenerational occupational mobility current in sociology. Section 3 
details how this chapter's questions supplement those about long-term 
unemployment from labor economics. Section 4 discusses data sources, 
difficulties in approximating (un)employment mobility tables from 
these sources, and comparability of tables. Section 5 empirically 
answers this chapter's first question, section 6 provides an answer to its 
second one. Section 7 reviews findings on both questions and returns 
to the theme of unemployment and social division. 
2 Questions on Unemployment and Research on Social Mobility 
In the past decade research in sociology on father-son occupational 
mobility has moved from recursive linear regression models 
incorporating father's and son's place on a ladder of occupational 
prestige to log-linear parameters for tables cross-classifying father's 
and son's position in a structure of occupational classes. One argument 
for this shift holds that a focus on classes is in line with the slackening 
performance of most western economies since the seventies 
(Goldthorpe 1985, p. 180). Indeed, double digit unemployment gives 
new credence to an old hypothesis on allocative effects of labor 
markets. It holds that every worker stands a permanent chance of 
unemployment and that labor markets do not clear, showing an 
oversupply of or an underdemand for labor (Engels 1845, p. 64 and p. 
117). 
Until recently, there were two ways of dealing with unemployed 
persons in mobility research. The first was deletion from the analysis. 
It seems to have been followed by Blau and Duncan in The American 
Occupational Structure. This practice might have led to misleading 
research results. An example is the finding "that the highly educated 
Negro suffers more from occupational discrimination than the less 
educated Negro" (Blau and Duncan 1967, p. 2ll). In the discussion of 
this result, there was no mention of the possibility that discrimination 
of less educated blacks cannot assume the form of lower occupational 
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prestige, but comes in the shape of higher unemployment. The second 
way was followed by Goldthorpe in Social Mobility and Class Structure 
in Modern Britain. It consists of assigning unemployed persons to the 
class of their last job (cf. Goldthorpe and Payne 1986, p. 15). This 
practice is admissable when unemployment is frictional. 
In a recent analysis of class mobility tables for Britain in 1972 and 
1983, Goldthorpe and Payne came up with a third way. They deemed 
it unacceptable to assign the nine percent unemployed in the 1983 
sample to the class of their last job and proceeded by adding a category 
for unemployed persons to the well-known Erikson-Goldthorpe-
Portocarero class scheme (Goldthorpe and Payne 1986, p. 15). 
At first sight, the effect of Goldthorpe and Payne's decision is 
somewhat inelegant as the scheme for father's class position was not 
expanded by an unemployed category, tables are unsquare. Although 
this addition to the scheme for fathers is in principle possible and for 
future mobility research desirable, a high unreliability is to be expected 
in answers to a retrospective survey question about father's 
unemployment at some specific date in the past. Apart from this 
practical difficulty, there is a more substantive difficulty with 
Goldthorpe and Payne's way of dealing with unemployment. 
Goldthorpe and Payne hint at a theoretical issue, as they treat the 
unemployed as having "so to speak" (Goldthorpe and Payne 1986, p. 15) 
a distinctive class position of their own. It is somewhat unorthodox to 
treat the unemployed as a special class, as within a class perspective 
unemployment is a risk continuously befalling all members of all non-
propertied classes. 
There is a rather simple way around this practical difficulty. 
Assuming the existence of a ladder of occupational prestige and a shift 
from ascriptive to achievement values, it is fitting to ask questions 
about intergenerational mobility on this ladder. A prime ascriptive 
characteristic, after all, is family origin. However, when asking 
questions about mobility within a class structure, a focus on 
intergenerational mobility is no longer obvious. If demand for labor 
continuously changes and labor markets do not clear oversupply or 
underdemand, there is less occasion to investigate intergenerational 
mobility. Market consequences are not postponed for a generation. This 
makes questions about intragenerational mobility appropriate (cf. 
Blossfeld 1986, p. 208). These questions need not be restricted to 
intragenerational mobility between occupations belonging to different 
classes, but may also focus on intragenerational mobility between 
employment and unemployment. Now governmental statistical bureaus 
in quite a few western industrial nations conduct periodic labor force 
surveys ascertaining size of the labor force, number of unemployed and 
duration of unemployment. Given these data, construction of reliable 
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tables for intragenerational mobility between employment and 
unemployment seems within reach. As unemployment duration data 
often are quite specific, construction of mobility tables for shorter 
periods (three months, six months) and longer periods (one year, two 
years) is possible. Analysis of short-period and long-period 
(un)employment mobility tables might be comparative (between 
countries) as well as historical (earlier and later periods within one 
country). 
This solution to a practical difficulty with a third way of dealing 
with unemployment in mobility research leads to a solution of the 
theoretical difficulty associated with this method. This solution consists 
of limiting the scope of current hypotheses on distributive 
consequences of labor markets to times of full employment and of 
specifying additional hypotheses for times of persistently high 
unemployment. Under an assumption of permanent full employment 
and jobs differing in strength of market position, outcomes of 
competitions for jobs with a stronger market position, are favorable to 
persons whose parents already had these jobs compared to persons 
whose parents held jobs with a weaker market position. Assuming 
substantial unemployment at the beginning and end of a specified 
period, apart from these unequal outcomes, other unequal competitive 
results obtain: outcomes of competitions for jobs (any job, not only 
jobs with a stronger market position) at the end of this period, are 
advantageous for persons already having some job compared to persons 
unemployed at the beginning of this period. As jobs with a stronger 
market position show a tendency to stay within families and as jobs 
with a weaker market position tend to remain within other families, so 
there is a tendency for unemployed persons to stay unemployed and for 
employed persons to remain employed. This chapter's questions are 
about the lattef' tendency. 
Answers to the question how unequal outcomes of competitions for 
jobs between employed and unemployed persons are, may be furnished 
by odds ratios for (un)employment mobility tables. Odds ratios form 
the backbone of log linear models recently used within sociology to 
analyze class mobility (Hout 1983). The focus of this chapter on 
unequal results of competitions between employed and unemployed 
persons over shorter and longer periods is therefore not only 
substantively, but also technically (Goldthorpe 1980, p. 77), in line 
with a revival of class analysis within sociology of stratification and 
mobility. 
3 Questions on Mobility and Research on Duration of Unemployment 
In the literature of labor economics, data on duration of unemployment 
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have been brought to bear on several questions. These data are 
originally published as absolute figures pertaining to one specific date. 
For instance, according to a labor force survey of the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, in October 1985 the number of unemployed persons 
in the United states was 7,917,000. This number is broken down by 
duration of unemployment 2,065,000 persons were unemployed for 15 
weeks and over, 1,110,000 for 27 weeks and over and 699,000 for 52 
weeks and over. The civilian labor force in October 1985 (employed 
persons plus unemployed persons) numbered 116,346,000 persons. Data 
on number of persons in the labor force, number of unemployed 
persons and duration of unemployment have been collected for some 
decades now and form splendid time series. 
Cross-sectional data of the kind just presented do not refer to length 
of a completed spell of unemployment. They only pertain to length up 
till now of a spell of unemployment in progress. A question often posed 
within labor economics is what the distribution of the length of 
completed spells of unemployment looks like and how it is to be 
derived from these cross-sectional duration figures (for an overview of 
this literature, see Freiburghaus 1978). It is clear that the second part 
of this question cannot be answered without additional assumptions. 
This chapter will not enter into their nature, as it does not ask 
questions about duration of completed spells of unemployment. It asks 
questions about what happened (or not) to persons within fixed periods. 
Another use of duration data is a comparison of a time series for 
absolute numbers of persons unemployed longer than a year with a 
time series for the number of all unemployed persons. These two 
graphs were presented, for instance, about a decade ago in a U.K. 
government publication (Department of Employment 1978, p. 678). 
The chart for long-term unemployment goes down a year later than 
that for all unemployed persons. It also rises a year later. A recent 
OECD study contained a regression analysis of time series for the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain and the United 
States. The absolute number of persons unemployed for more than a 
year was predicted well by the percentage of unemployment a year 
earlier and less well by the change in unemployment rate during that 
year (OECD 1983, pp. 95-96). These results underline the adage that 
a good answer to a forecasting question need not be a proper solution 
of a why-problem. This contribution seeks to explain. It does so, 
partly, by computing percentages. 
It is tempting to express the absolute number of long-term 
unemployed persons at a certain date as a percentage of all unemployed 
persons at that date. For instance, the numbers for the United States 
just mentioned may be transformed into the following percentages: in 
October 1985 the unemployed formed 6.8 percent of the labor force; 
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of all persons unemployed at that date, 26.1 percent was unemployed 
for 15 weeks and over, 14.0 percent for 27 weeks and over and 8.8 
percent for 52 weeks and over. Percentages of this type are printed in 
official statistical publications and have been computed in labor 
economics. 
Cripps and Tarling warned more than a decade ago against "perverse 
composition effects" in interpreting percentages so obtained. Assume 
that at some point in time the probability for long-term unemployed 
persons to stay unemployed is lower than the probability for long-term 
unemployed persons to stay unemployed at some earlier point in time. 
Also assume that this decrease coincides with a lower number of 
employed persons becoming unemployed. Depending on the combined 
result of these two changes, it is quite possible that the number of 
long-term unemployed at a certain date as a percentage of all those 
unemployed at that date grows (Cripps and Tarling 1974, p. 296). 
One also might say that in the example just given, absolute numbers 
of long-term unemployed persons are related to the wrong base. The 
number of persons unemployed in the U.S. for more than one year in 
October 1985, should have been divided by 7,989,000, the 
unemployment number in October 1984. The number of persons 
unemployed for 27 weeks or more is to be divided by 8,150,000 (the 
unemployment number for April 1985). The number of persons 
unemployed for 15 weeks and over might have been related to the 
number of unemployed persons in July 1985 (8,682,000). By 
performing these computations, transition probabilities are obtained, 
measures with a more substantive interpretation than simple 
percentages. An early instance of transition rates is Fowler (1968). 
In labor economics time series of transition probabilities for 
unemployed persons have been constructed and analyzed (see, for 
instance, Cripps and Tarling 1974, pp. 298-299). However, even the 
finding that as the level of unemployment at the beginning of a period 
is higher, persons unemployed at the beginning of this period are more 
likely to remain unemployed during this period, is not very 
illuminating. After all, it is quite likely that as the level of 
unemployment becomes higher, the chances for the employed to 
become unemployed rise too. However, if it were to be found that, 
with rising unemployment, the probability of staying unemployed 
increases faster than the chances of becoming unemployed, a telling 
finding would have been made. In the same vein one might divide the 
probability for the unemployed persons to become employed by the 
chance of employed persons staying unemployed. 
A more pertinent question therefore pertains to a table cross-
classifying a person's employment or unemployment at the start of a 
period against this person's employment or unemployment at the end 
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of this period may be constructed. This table represents the result of 
a competition for jobs between unemployed and employed persons. 
This chapter's questions are on the outcome of these contests. 
One reason why questions about unequal results of competitions for 
jobs between employed and unemployed persons have been neglected 
in labor economics is lack of data. Assumptions for approximation of 
tables cross-classifying a person's employment or unemployment at the 
beginning of a period against this person's (un)employment at the end 
of this period, are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
4 Approximation Difficulties, Data Sources and Comparability of Data 
To construct an intragenerational (un)employment mobility table on 
basis of published governmental statistics, several types of data and 
additional assumptions are necessary. Requirements are best discussed 
by way of an example (see Tables la and lb). Suppose one wishes to 
construct a table for the United States for mobility or lack of mobility 
Table 1. How to construct ( un )employment mobility tables from periodic 
labor force survey or administrative data; (a) published data from the 
·U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, (b) cell frequencies obtained after 
substraction and addition 
(a) 
em-
Octoberployed 
1984 unem-
ployed 
October 1985 
employed unemployed 
? ? 
? 699 
? 7,917 
? 
7,989 
116,346 
116,346: number of persons in the labor force in October 1984 
7,989 : number of unemployed persons in October 1984 
7,917 :number of unemployed persons in October 1985 
699 :number of persons unemployed for more than a year in 
October 1985 (all numbers in l,OOO's) 
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(b) 
em-
Octoberployed 
1984 unem-
ployed 
October 1985 
employed unemployed 
101,139 7,218 108,357 
7,290 699 7,989 
108,429 7,917 116,346 
between the categories of employed and unemployed over the period 
October 1984 - October 1985. Knowing the number of unemployed 
persons for October 1984 and for October 1985, two marginal 
frequencies may be entered into Table Ia. For October 1985 it is also 
known also how many persons unemployed in that month have been 
unemployed for more than a year. This means that the frequency of the 
unemployed-unemployed cell may be entered into Table Ia. (There is 
a snag here, that will be discussed later.) Now suppose that the 
population of all persons employed or unemployed in October 1984 is 
closed. As the size of the labor force (persons employed or 
unemployed) for this date is also known, another figure may be entered 
into Table Ia. From these four given, it is po~sible to complete the 
(un)employment mobility table. For results obtained on basis of the 
entries in Table I a, see Table 1 b. 
To generalize: (un)employment mobility tables may be constructed 
by combining stock data on size of labor force and numbers of 
unemployed persons with data about duration of unemployment. 
Following Freiburghaus' (1978, p. 148) nomenclature of methods for 
computing transition probabilities for short-term and long-term 
unemployed persons, this method will be called the "balance-sheet 
method". 
(Un)employment mobility tables constructed by the balance-sheet 
method are approximations. The assumption of a closed labor force is 
clearly false. Whether this objection is a serious one, is less obvious. 
Inter- and intragenerational class mobility tables leave deaths and 
emigrations out of account too. Within labor economics the question 
whether "unemployed" and "out of the labor force" are distinctive 
states, has been answered by a qualified "yes" (Flinn and Heckman 
1983). -
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The balance-sheet method lumps together persons that were 
employed at the beginning of a period, unemployed in the meantime, 
and employed again at the end, with persons employed for the whole 
period. This is not objectionable. The snag of the balance-sheet method 
is that it does not count persons unemployed at the beginning of a 
period, employed in the meantime, and unemployed again at the end 
of this period, as belonging to the unemployed-unemployed category. 
As the period over which mobility is determined lengthens, so this 
difficulty looms larger. In fact, the severity of the difficulty will vary 
from country to country and time to time. For this contribution, this 
difficulty could not be quantified. It is, in some way, part of a bargain 
and something to be taken in stride. It is desirable to analyze better 
(un)employment mobility tables, but they are hard to obtain in 
numbers sufficient for comparative and historical questions. Labor 
economists attempted to construct one-month mobility tables from 
matched records for successive U.S.labor force surveys. This effort led 
to a special conference so far without tangible results (Hogue and 
Flame 1986). · 
For some countries there are data on repeated spells of 
unemployment, and its incidence over periods of one year does appear 
·worrying for the balance-sheet method adopted in this chapter. In the 
United States the number of persons with more than one spell of 
unemployment during one year as a percentages of all persons 
unemployed at some time during that year hovers around 30 (Bowers 
1980, p. 29). However, the United States is a country for which 
common sense suggests one of the highest frequencies op repeated 
spells of unemployment (for some data supportive of this notion, see 
OECD 1985, p. 100). Yet, if an occasion arises, this difficulty of the 
balance-sheet method will be emphasized.' Note that the snag of the 
balance-sheet method results in odds ratios for (un)employment 
mobility tables that are farther from one than they would be otherwise. 
They indicate too much in equality of results. 
One defense of the balance-sheet method holds that persons 
unemployed for the full length of a period do differ from those 
unemployed at the beginning and the end and employed in bet:ween. 
The three specific questions asked in this chapter are part of a more 
general question about openness of societies and newly arising closed 
categories at their margin. Given the latter question, it is perhaps not 
objectionable for the balance-sheet method to separate persons 
unemployed at the beginning and end of a period and employed in 
between from those permanently unemployed. It is to the latter persons 
that the questions of this chapter pertain. 
This argument leads up to a clear cut circumscription of the balance 
sheet method's applicability. The thesis that with double digit 
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unemployment in western industrial societies a closed group is arising, 
comes in two versions, and the balance sheet method is relevant for 
testing one of them. On the one hand it may be maintained that 
permanently high unemployment rates lead to a category of persons 
unemployed for indefinite periods. On the other hand it may be held 
that these rates do not lead to a division between those invariably 
unemployed and those working, but to a division between those having 
lasting employment and those continuously shifting between 
employment and unemployment. The first version of this thesis may be 
called the strong one, the second the weak one. By its nature the 
balance sheet method allows for testing the strong but not the weak 
version. 
A method for constructing (un)employment mobility tables being 
specified, necessary data were to be collected. A list of western 
industrial nations was made, in effect the member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
minus Greece, Portugal and Turkey (because of their high percentage 
of labor force in agriculture) and Iceland and Luxembourg (as their 
number of inhabitants was deemed too small for inclusion in a 
comparative investigation). This left a total of nineteen countries. 
The first goal in collecting data for these countries was to obtain as 
many data as possible on duration of unemployment. They were to be 
furnished by labor force sample surveys. If that source for a country 
was unavailable, bookkeeping data of labor exchanges, social security 
agencies etc. were to be used. If neither of these data were available in 
original sources, second-hand data from supra-national bodies like the 
European Communities and the OECD were allowed. The international 
collection of the library of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics was 
searched. For sixteen countries sufficiently long ,, series of 
unemployment duration data were found. The three countries without 
enough available data were Denmark, New Zealand and Switzerland. 
The high-high goal in collecting duration data was to construct four 
series of ten tables for each country: ten three-months tables, ten six-
months tables, ten one-year tables and ten two-years tables. Earliest 
tables were to have 1975 as starting date, latest tables 1984. This goal 
only was met for Belgium and France. The low-low goal was at least 
six tables in the decade 1975-1984 for at least one short-period series 
(three-months or six-months tables) and at least six tables in this 
decade for at least one long-period series (one-year or two-years 
tables). Japan just made this goal, all other countries surpassed it. The 
high-low goal (four series of at least six tables) has been attained for 
six countries. The low-high goal (at least one complete short-period 
series and at least one complete long-period series) was reached for 
eleven countries. All in all, of all 640 possible tables for sixteen 
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countries, 474 tables were obtained, that is, 26 percent of all possible 
values were missing. The analysis of this chapter pertains to 127 three-
months tables, 140 six-months tables, 144 one-year tables and 63 two-
years tables. 
A subsidiary goal in collecting duration data was that 
(un)employment mobility tables, whether short-period or long-period 
tables, should have the same starting month. In that case it remains 
possible, at a later date, to provide a direct answer to questions about 
inequalities in outcomes of contests between short- and long-term 
unemployed persons. This goal was met for six countries: Australia, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and The United 
States. 
The second goal in collecting data was to obtain the number of 
persons unemployed in a country at dates, given the dating of duration 
data, allowing for construction of (un)employment mobility tables. As 
stock data are more abundant than duration data, there were no 
specific difficulties in obtaining these numbers. In all cases except one, 
unemployment numbers were found in sources also yielding duration 
data. The odd one out was Japan. Duration data are from special yearly 
surveys, numbers on unemployment from monthly labor force surveys . 
. The third goal was to obtain the necessary numbers for size of the 
labor force. If no data from the same source as duration data were 
found, other sources were used. The latter were necessary for countries 
with administrative duration data. In most of these cases no monthly 
or quarterly and only yearly numbers for size of the labor force turned 
out to be available. Collection of data on legal obstacles against 
redundancies and of data for length of above minimum unemployment 
benefits, is discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 
There are at least four points on which (un)employment mobility 
tables for different countries are not fully comparable. There are 
differences in data collection (labor force· surveys or bookkeeping 
data), in seasonal influences on data, in starting months of short- and 
long-period (un)employment mobility tables, and in availability of 
monthly data on size of the labor force. 
For eight nations included in this study, (un)employment mobility 
tables have been constructed on the basis of data from labor force 
surveys. All these surveys have been modelled on the original survey 
of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. These eight countries are 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the 
United States. Time series for eight other countries are based on book-
keeping data. These countries are Austria, Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, The Irish Republic, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. 
It has been stated (OECD 1983, pp. 53-54) that bookkeeping data 
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are less comparable from country to country than survey data. Most 
tabor force surveys have been modelled on the U.S. one, so here 
comparability is large. However, as eligibility rules for unemployment 
compensation vary from country to country, so might administrative 
data on number of unemployed and duration of unemployment. 
Although some checks are possible, none will be performed here. (Since 
the early seventies the EC every two years conducts labor force surveys 
in its member countries, and their results may be compared with 
administrative data.) 
It is quite possible that data for duration of unemployed, like 
numbers for unemployed persons, display seasonal influences. These 
had to be eliminated or equalized for all countries. The European 
Communities present time series for duration of unemployment in its 
member countries referring to October of each year. (The data of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, as they refer to the end of September, 
form an exception.) It was therefore decided to take October as the 
starting and ending month of one-year and two-year (un)employment 
mobility tables outside the EC. (For Australia the month of April was 
chosen.) However, this decision could not be fully implemented. Labor 
force surveys in Italy and Spain are held quarterly so in these cases the 
fourth quarter was chosen. Japanese data for duration of 
unemployment are taken from a special survey conducted once a year, 
usually in March. One-year (un)employment mobility tables for 
Norway and Sweden do not pertain to one specific month, as the 
necessary breakdowns of unemployment by duration only were 
available as annual averages. 
Then there was the choice of a starting and ending date for three-
months and six-months (un)employment mobility tables. If these 
duration data are only available for one· month. a year, there is not 
much to choose. This was the case for Austria, Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Finland, the Irish Republic and Japan. 
However, it was felt that this choice by necessity is not a happy one. 
It results in three-months, six-months, one-year and two-years 
(un)employment mobility tables having an identical ending date. As 
indicated, a common starting date is neater. It does not pr~clude the 
possibility of directly answering questions about unequal outcomes of 
competitions between short- and long-term unemployed persons. For 
this reason, for other countries (except Australia) October was chosen 
as starting date for three-months and six-months unemployment 
mobility tables. If one makes this choice, for construction of short-
period (un)employment mobility tables, data for duration of 
unemployment have to be found for the months of January and April. 
For Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States there were no difficulties in obtaining 
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these data. For Norway and Sweden data for the first quarter of a year 
were used. 
A final point on which (un}employment mobility tables are not fully 
comparable between countries is availability of monthly or quarterly 
data on the size of the labor force. These data were not available for 
Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Irish 
Republic, Japan and the Netherlands. Here annual data were used 
instead. For other countries, monthly or quarterly labor force surveys 
provided the data on size of the labor force needed for the construction 
of (un}employment mobility tables. An appendix to this contribution 
gives a run-down on sources for all countries figuring in this 
contribution. It also contains specific comments on completeness, 
homogeneity and other aspects of time series for (un)employment 
mobility tables. 
5 Level of Unemployment, Increase in Unemployment and Unequal 
Results of Competition for Jobs between Employed and Unemployed 
Persons 
The first question of this contribution is whether, if the general level 
ef unemployment in a country is higher, outcomes of competitions for 
jobs are more strongly disadvantageous for those already unemployed, 
and whether, if the increase in the general level of unemployment in 
a country over the period covered by an (un)employment mobility table 
. is larger, unfavorable competitive results for persons already 
unemployed increase too. 
A very simple hypothesis about competition for jobs between 
employed and unemployed persons holds that it is easier for employed 
persons to keep a job than it is for unemployed persons to find a job. 
This hypothesis may be expanded into a more interesting one: if -
given the size of the labor force- the number of jobs competed for is 
smaller, the outcome of this contest is more unfavorable for 
unemployed persons. A more careful but also more tortuous wording 
of this augmented hypothesis holds that the higher the general level of 
unemployment in a country at a certain point time, the more 
disadvantageous for persons unemployed at that point in time is the 
outcome of a competitions for jobs at a later point in time between 
those employed and those unemployed at that earlier date. Another 
addition holds that the larger the increase in the general level of 
unemployment between two points in time, the more unfavorable for 
those unemployed at the earliest of these two points is the outcome of 
the competition for jobs at the later of these two points between those 
employed and unemployed at the earlier of these dates. 
These hypotheses about inequalities in (un}employment mobility 
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tables may be compared with hypotheses prominent in sociology of 
stratification and mobility. These hypotheses are about relative chances 
in intergenerationa1 occupational prestige mobility tables (Heath 1981 ), 
intergenerationa1 class mobility tables (Grusky and Hauser 1984), or 
intergenerational standard of living mobility tables (Ultee and Luijkx 
1986). With respect to each of these types of mobility, hypotheses have 
been tested about their determination by absolute level of economic 
development and by relative changes in these levels. A higher level of 
economic development and a more rapid pace of economic 
development were supposed to foster social fluidity. Here these 
hypotheses have been adapted to intragenerational (un)employment 
mobility tables. A lower percentage of the labor force unemployed 
might be analogous to a higher level of economic development, and a 
stronger decrease in percentage unemployed is supposed to correspond 
to a more rapid pace of economic development. 
These hypotheses about absolute level of and increase in 
unemployment are tested by way of regression analysis. The variable 
to be explained is not the odds ratio of an (un)employment mobility 
table, but the log (In) of this odds ratio. Models for logged odds ratios 
provided a somewhat better fit than models for odds ratios. Given the 
nature of the data, this was to be expected. One explanatory variable 
was the number of unemployed persons at the beginning of a period as 
a percentage of all persons in the labor force at that date. Another 
e.xplanatory variable was the log of the fraction of the number of 
persons unemployed at the end of a period to the number of persons 
unemployed at the beginning of a period. In addition there were 
dummies for country name. 
Table 2 presents R:~.s and degrees of freedom of models fitted. 
Models have been fitted separately for three-months (un)employment 
mobility tables, six-months tables, one-year tables and two-years 
tables. The general conclusion is that unemployment at the beginning 
of a period and increase in unemployment during a period each make 
their own small contribution. It may be added that the correlation 
between level of unemployment and increase in unemployment is 
rather low (-.10 for three-months tables, .20 for six-months tables,-
.07 for one-year tables and -.28 for two-years tables). 
To find out whether the effects of unemployment at the beginning 
of a period and increase in unemployment during a period go into the 
predicted direction, regression coefficients of the best-fitting model of 
Table 2a are presented in Table 2b. It is clear from the positive and 
mostly significant signs of coefficients for unemployment at the 
beginning of a period, that effects are as predicted. The higher 
unemployment, the more unequal outcomes of competitions for jobs 
between employed and unemployed persons. All coefficients for 
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increase in unemployment turn out to be insignificant. 
Table 2. Regression of logs of odds ratios of (un)employment mobility 
tables on level of unemployment at the start of a period ( SU), increase 
in unemployment during this period ( IU) and dummies (C) for country 
name 
(a) 
models 
three 
months 
tables 
R2 ndf 
(I) su .05 125 
(2) IU .20 125 
(3) SU+IU .24 124 
(4) c .96 111 
(5) C+SU+I .98 109 
(p) parameters 
(5) constant3.9 
su 4.9 
IU 0.2 (ns) 
c * 
n=l27 
six 
months 
tables 
R2 ndf 
.06 138 
.03 138 
.08 137 
.95 124 
.96 122 
parameters 
2.4 
3.5 
-0.1 (ns) 
* 
n=l40 
one two 
months years 
tables tables 
R2 ndf R 2 ndf 
.01 142 .03 61 
.01 142 .01 61 
.02 141 .03 60 
.95 128 .84 47 
.96 126 perverted 
parameters parameters 
1.2 # 
3.3 # 
-0.8 (ns) # 
• # 
n=l44 n= 63 
* to save space, the fifteen dummies for country name are not 
reported. 
# no parameters obtained as model is perverted. 
In the next section of this chapter, dummies for country name entered 
into models fitted in this section, are replaced by explanatory variables 
for specific aspects of legal arrangements in countries. 
6 Obstacles to Redundancies, Unemployment Benefits and Unequal 
Results of Competition for Jobs between Employed and Unemployed 
Persons 
The second question of this chapter is whether in nations where 
dismissal of employed persons is legally more difficult, disadvantages 
for those already unemployed are stronger, and whether these 
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inequalities also are enhanced by a temporally slower drop of 
unemployment benefits to some general social minimum. 
Behind this question lie two everyday hypotheses on the 
consequences of legal arrangements for unequal competitive results. 
The first hypothesis holds that if it is legally more difficult for 
employers to dismiss employees, actual probabilities for employed 
persons to keep their jobs are higher, while chances for unemployed 
persons to find jobs are lower. The second hypothesis holds that the 
longer unemployment benefits are above some minimum level, the 
smaller the probability that unemployed persons within a fixed period 
will be employed again, and the more unequal results of competitions 
for jobs between employed and unemployed persons will turn out to 
be. 
These hypotheses on legal arrangements and unequal results of 
competitions for jobs between employed and unemployed persons, are 
to be compared with hypotheses prominent in the analysis of tables for 
intergenerational social mobility. Hypotheses on the consequences of 
government by social-democratic and by communist parties (Heath 
1981, Grusky and Hauser 1984, Ultee and Luijkx 1986), albeit vaguely, 
are hypotheses about consequences of legal stipulations too. In the 
present case of analysis of (un)employment mobility tables, these 
provisions have been circumscribed more precisely. One might say that 
specific laws have been scaled after something like their strictness. 
There were no specific difficulties in obtaining country scores for 
legal obstacles to dismissal of employees. A recent OECD study 
contained detailed descriptions of laws on this matter in all of its 
member countries (OECD 1986b, pp. 100-105). On the basis of these 
depictions a scale with four categories was devised: a) no legal obstacles 
to large-scale redundancies, b) duty to inform unions, workers' 
council, etc. before large-scale redundancie:;, c) duty to inform and to 
consult unions, workers' council, etc., before large-scale redundancies, 
d) duty to inform and consult unions, etc., plus permission of 
authorities before large-scale redundancies. 
As to the place of specific countries on this scale: The United States 
was the only country in category a), category b) was filled by 
Australia, Canada, Finland, the Irish Republic, the Netherlands and 
Norway, in category c) were Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, while the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and Japan populated category d). It was assumed that these legal 
arrangements have not changed during 1975-1984, the decade to which 
analyzed (un)employment mobility tables pertain. Although this 
explanatory variable is ordinal in nature, it was decided to enter it as 
three dummies into regression models. 
It was more cumbersome to devise and obtain measures for legal 
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arrangements on the financial situation of unemployed persons. In the 
end it was decided to use one measure combining length of 
unemployment benefits and amount of unemployment benefits. This 
measure was the length of the period persons according to social 
security laws receive unemployment benefits above some general social 
minimum. To understand this measure, it is to be observed that 
unemployed persons for some time after having been made redundant, 
in most countries receive. a percentage of their last income, whatever 
(up to a maximum) their income may have been, and that after this 
time everybody receives a general social minimum. 
Three categories were distinguished on this explanatory variable: a) 
benefits drop to this minimum within 26 weeks, b) minimum reached 
after 26 weeks and within 52 weeks, and c) minimum attained after 52 
weeks. Data were taken from various sources, that were checked 
against each other (International Labor Office 1976, Sorrentino 1976, 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1976, Commissie 
van de Europese Gemeenschappen 1977, OECD 1979, Euvrard et al. 
1982, Garcia de Blas 1985). Countries in category a) were Australia, 
Italy and Spain, in category b) Canada, Finland, Ireland, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, and in category 
·c) Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, the Irish Republic, 
Japan and the Netherlands. It was supposed that these legal stipulations 
in these sixteen countries remained the same during 197 5-1984. This 
ordinal explanatory variable was entered as two dummies into 
regression models. 
Table 3a presents Rl>s and degrees of freedom of models fitted. 
Models have been fitted separately for tables of different duration. 
Comparison with Table 2a makes clear that the two explanatory 
variables of this section make a substantial contribution to R2• It may 
be stated that the highest correlation between the three dummies for 
legal obstacles was -0.59. The correlation between the two dummies for 
above minimum benefits was -0.40. The highest correlation between a 
dummy for legal obstacles and a dummy for above minimum benefits 
was 0.30. 
To see whether the explanatory variables display their supposed 
effects, constants and regression coefficients are to be consulted. They 
are, for the best-fitting model of Table 3a, presented in Table 3b. The 
signs and sizes of constants and dummies make clear that neither of the 
explanatory variables displays a monotonous relationship with the 
dependent variable, the log of the odds ratio of an (un)employment 
mobility table. In the case of obstacles to redundancies, the presence of 
a monotonous relationship seems evident going from the "no obstacles" 
by way of the "information" to the "consultation" category, but the 
relationship changes direction going on to the "authorities" category. In 
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the first two cases, the log of the odds ratio rises, in the last case it 
drops. For instance, if for all three-months tables, the log of the odds 
ratio for the "authorities" categories is made equal to the constant (4.2), 
Table 3. Regression of logs of odds ratios of (un)employment mobility 
tables on unemployment at the start of a period ( SU ), increase in 
unemployment during this period ( IU ), dummies for legal bstacles to 
dismissals ( L01, L02• L03) and dummies for duration of above 
minimum unemployment benefits (UB1 and UB2) 
(a) 
models 
three-
months 
tables 
R 2 ndf 
(6) SU+IU+L01 
+L02+L03 .67 121 (7) SU+IU 
+UB1+UB2 .52 122 (8) SU+IU+L01 
. +L02+L03 
+UB 1+UB2 .90 119 
(b) parameters 
(8) constant 4.2 
su 4.0 
IU -2.1 
LOI -0.7 
L02 0.4 
L03 1.4 
UBI -1.3 
UB2 -1.5 
n=l27 
six-
months 
tables 
R2 ndf 
.50 134 
.50 135 
.75 132 
parameters 
3.1 
3.6 
2.2 
-0.8 
0.4 
1.0 
-1.2 
-1.6 
n=l40 
one- two-
year years 
tables tables 
R2 ndf R2ndf 
.36 138 .38 58 
.36 139 .12 58 
.57 136 .69 56 
parameter-s parameters 
1.6 1.8 
-5.2· -2.8(ns) 
-0.1 (ns) 0.7 
-0.6 dropped 
0.3 (ns) 1.1 
1.0 1.9 
-1.0 -1.2 
-1.4 -0.9 
n=l44 n= 63 
the log of the odds ratio for the "no obstacles" category is 3.5, the log 
of the odds ratio for the "information" category is 4.6, while that for 
the "consultation" category is 5.6. There are, therefore, "two rights and 
one wrong". Forgetting the last category, the relationship is in the 
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predicted direction: the less legal obstacles to redundancy, the more 
equal outcomes of competitions between employed and unemployed 
perso,ns. 
It is more difficult to say something about the extent to which the 
direction of the effects of length of above minimum unemployment 
benefits, is and is not as predicted. Going from the category "at 
minimum within 26 weeks" to the category "at minimum between 26 
and 52 weeks", the log of the odds ratio drops, which is not as 
expected. Going from the. last-mentioned category to the category 
"minimum after at last one year", the log of the odds ratio rises, which 
is as predicted. Certainly, it would have been possible that in both 
cases changes went into the wrong direction, but "one right and one 
wrong" more strongly contradict an hypothesis than "two rights and one 
wrong". 
Until now (un)employment mobility tables pertaining to periods of 
different lengths have been analyzed separately. In conclusion models 
for tables referring to all periods will be presented. 
7 Conclusion and Discussion 
T~e models presented in Table 4 allow for a review of all three specific 
questions asked in this chapter. The first question of this chapter was 
about consequences of level of unemployment and increase in 
unemployment for inequalities in competitive outcomes. According to 
the models in Table 4, the conclusion still holds that the higher the 
unemployment at the start of a period to which an (un)employment 
mobility table refers, the more unequal outcomes of competitions for 
jobs between employed and unemployed persons. Given the positive 
and significant coefficients for increase in unemployment, there now 
is some evidence that a larger in increase in unemployment during the 
period of a mobility table, will lead to more unequal competitive 
results. It is not clear how this finding for all tables combined is to be 
squared with earlier findings for tables of different duration 
separately. The latter coefficients for increase in unemployment were 
insignificant. The second question of this chapter was whether legal 
obstacles to redundancies and above minimum unemployment benefits 
make outcomes of competitions for jobs between employed and 
unemployed persons more unequal. According to the models in Table 
4, there is some indication that legal obstacles to redundancies makes 
competitive outcomes more unequal. However, this indication is not 
strong, as permission of authorities, the highest score on the scale for 
legal obstacles, is associated with somewhat lower unequal outcomes. 
It might be suggested that government permission tends to results in 
decisions in favor of employers and against unions. This explanation of 
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findings, though ad hoc, is in principle testable. Case-histories of 
large-scale redundancies in several countries might be useful here. 
According to the models in Table 4, indications that duration of above 
Table 4. Regression of logs of odds ratios of (un)employment mobility 
tables on unemployment at the start of a period (SU), increase in 
unemployment during this period ( lU ), dummies for legal obstacles to 
dismissals (L01, L02, L03), dummies for duration of above minimum 
unemployment benefits (UB1 and UB2), dummies for country name (C), 
length of period over which unemployment is observed ( LP) and 
dummies for length of period ( LP1, LP2 and LP3) 
(a) models 
(5) C+SU+IU 
(8) SU+IU+L01+L02+L03+UB1+UB2 (9) SU+IU+L01+L02+L03+UB1+UB2+LP (10) SU+IU+L01+L02+L03+UB1+UB2+LP1+LP2+LP3 (II) C+SU+IU+LP 
.36 456 
.20 466 
.82 465 
.82 463 
.95 455 
.95 453 (12) C+SU+IU+LP1+LP2+LP3 
(b) parameters 
(9) 5.1 
(10) 0.5 
(11) 4.9 
(12) 0.1 
5.1 0.9 -0.9 0.3 
5.0 0.9 -0.8 0.3 
4.1 0.4 
4.1 0.4 
1.0 -1.0 -1.3 
1.1 -1.0 -1.3 
N=474 
-1.2 
3.4 2.3 1.0 
• -1.2 
• 3.6 2.4 1.2 
* to save space, the fifteen dummies for country name are not reported 
minimum unemployment benefits make for more unequal competitive 
outcomes, are even weaker. These findings tend to support the notion 
that for unemployed persons loss of employment is more decisive than 
loss of income. 
The answers to this chapter's two specific questions are pertinent to 
the more general question at the background of this chapter, the 
question whether in contemporary industrial societies with permanently 
high levels of unemployment, new categories of persons are arising, a 
category of persons that are unemployed and tend to stay unemployed 
and a category of persons that are employed and tend to stay employed. 
The evidence of this contribution does not clearly point into the 
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direction of the making of a permanently unemployed underclass and 
a permanently employed more privileged class. 
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APPENDIX ON DATA SOURCES 
AUSTRIA 
All tables have August as ending date and have been taken from 
Statistisches Handbuch fur die Republik Oesterreich, several years. Data 
on the size of the labor force are yearly and have been taken from the 
same source. Monthly unemployment data were obtained from OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators, Historical Statistics 1964-1983, Paris, 
OECD, 1984, with additions for later years from the Statistische 
Nachrichten included in the Statistische Uebersichten (Austria), several 
years. Constructed (un)employment mobility tables pertain to six-
months and one-year periods. The ending date of the earliest table is 
1976, of the latest one 1985. Series have no gaps. Duration data and 
employment numbers are administrative. The total number of three-
months, six-months, one-year and two-years mobility tables is 
respectively 0, 10, 10 and 0, that is, 20 in all. 
AUSTRALIA 
(Un)Employment mobility tables generally have April as starting month 
and have been taken from reports on labor force surveys by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, published as The Labor Force Australia, 
monthly series. As these series were preceded by quarterly ones, tables 
starting in 1975, 1976 and 1977 have May as starting month. Data on 
number of unemployed in specific months and monthly size of the 
labor force, have been taken from the same source. Three- and six-
months mobility tables are available from 1975 up to and including 
1985, one-year tables from 1976. The earliest two-year tables starts in 
1978, the latest one in 1984. Series have no gaps. Total numbers of 
tables: lO, lO, 9, 7 (36). 
BELGIUM 
Data on duration of unemployment are administrative. As series having 
October as a starting date, because of a strike, reveal a gap for 1977, 
tables having June as ending date were constructed. These duration 
data were taken from Statistisch Jaarboek van Belgie, several years. 
Monthly unemployment data have been taken from the same source. 
Data on size of the labor force were yearly and have been taken from 
Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment 1986. There are three- and 
six-months and one-year and two-years tables and series for these 
tables have no gaps. Total number of tables: 10, 10, 10, 10 (40). 
CANADA 
Duration data for three-months tables stem from labor force surveys. 
They are taken from Statistics Canada, The Canadian Labor Force. 
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monthly series and have October as starting date. Because of 
unavailability of data for January 1976, the first table of the series has 
December 1975 as ending and September 1975 as starting date. The 
latest table of this series has October 1984 as a starting date. Data on 
number of unemployed and size of the labor force have been taken 
from the same source. This source gives no numbers for persons 
unemployed for more than six months and for more than a year. Data 
from the same labor force surveys are presented, as annual averages of 
monthly data, in OECD, OECD Employment Outlook, several years. 
Annual averages for number unemployed and size of the labor force, 
were taken from Statistics Canada, Labor Force Annual Averages 1975-
1983, and later publications with annual averages. The earliest one-
year mobility table has 1975 as starting date, the latest one 1984, the 
earliest six-month table starts in 1978, the latest in 1984. There are no 
gaps in series. Total number of tables: 10, 7, 10, 0 (27). 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Tables for three- and six months and one-year and two-years periods 
have end of September as ending date. The first three series are 
complete. The series for two-year tables lacks the latest one. Data on 
duration of unemployment have been taken from Amtliche Nachrichten 
der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, special reports in several years. They are 
administrative in character. Data on numbers of unemployed in 
specific months and annual size of the labor force have been taken 
from Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment 1986. Total number of 
tables: 10, 10, 10, 9 (39). 
FINLAND 
Data for duration of unemployment only are available as annual 
averages. The source is Tilastokeskus, Tilastotiedotus Sur ja Uro Ty, 
several years. Data on annual averages for unemployment and size of 
the labor force have been taken from the same source. The first table 
of the series has 1977 as a starting date, the last one 1983. All data stem 
from labor force surveys. Total number of tables: 5, 8, 7, 7 (27). 
FRANCE 
Time series stem from bookkeeping of labor exchanges and have 
October as a starting date. Source is Ministere du Travail, de l'Emploi 
et de la Formation Professionnelle, Statistiques du Travail, Bulletin 
Mensuel, several years. Data on numbers of unemployed have been 
taken from the same source. The starting date of the earliest tables is 
October 1975, the starting date of the last tables is 1984. All series are 
complete. Data for the size of the labor force are yearly and have been 
taken from Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment 1986. Numbet of 
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cases: 10, 10, 10, 10 ( 40). 
IRISH REPUBLIC 
Duration data assembled in November 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 have 
been taken from Central Statistics Office (Irish Republic), The Trend 
in Unemployment, several years. Unemployment numbers were taken 
form the same source. Duration data collected in October 1980, 1981, 
1982, 1983 and 1984 are Central Statistics Office, Statistical Abstract 
of Ireland, several years. Unemployment numbers are from the same 
source. Duration data for .October 1985 are from Central Statistics 
Office, Irish Statistical Bulletin, 1986. Data on size of the labor force 
are from Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment 1986. Data on 
unemployment duration are administrative. There are three-months, 
six-months and one-year tables. Series have a gap for tables having 
1979 as ending date. Number of tables: 9, 9, 9, 0 (27). 
ITALY 
Time series stem from administrative records. There are only two-years 
tables (with 1981 and 1982 as starting dates). Three-months, six-
months and one-year tables have October as ending date, running from 
1978 up and including 1984. Source is Eurostat, Employment and 
Unemployment, several years. Data for number of unemployed in 
specific months and annual size of the labor force have been taken 
from the same source. Number of tables: 7, 7, 7, 2 (23). 
JAPAN 
No original sources have been employed. Data on unemployment 
duration have been taken from OECD, OECD Employment·Outlook, 
several years. These data in turn stem from labor force surveys 
conducted every year in March (except for 1983 when it was June, and 
1984 when the survey took place in April-May). First survey year was 
1978, last survey year 1984. Monthly data on numbers unemployed and 
yearly data on size of the labor force have been taken from OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators, Historical Statistics 1096-1983. Only six-
months and one-year tables were constructed. Number of tables: 0, 6, 
6, 0 (12). 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Series for three-months, six-months and one-year tables are complete. 
For 1975 and 1976 they have November as starting date, for 1976 and 
later October. Data are from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Sociale 
Maandstatistiek, several years. Unemployment numbers are from the 
same source. Two-years tables are based on annual averages and use 
data from Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
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Rap portage Arbeidsmarkt, several years. The earliest table of this series 
has 1978 as starting date. Data are administrative. Data on size of the 
labor force are from Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment 1986. 
Number of tables: 10, 10, 10, 7 (37). 
NORWAY 
Duration data, numbers unemployed and size of the labor force are 
labor force survey data. They were taken from Central Bureau of 
Statistics of Norway, Statistical Yearbook, several years, 
Arbeidsmarkedstatistikk; several years and Statistisk Ukehefte, several 
years. Duration data are annual averages. There are no two-years 
tables. The earliest table of each series is missing. Number of tables; 9, 
9, 9, 0 (27). 
SPAIN 
Data are from quarterly labor force surveys La Poblacion Activa, 
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Due to issues 
missing in the library of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, there 
are gaps in series. Number of tables: 7, 7, 7, 6 (27). 
SWEDEN 
Data for three-months tables are based on quarterly figures from labor 
force surveys. Source is Sveriges Officiella Statistik, 
Arbetskraftsundersokninga, several years. Six-months and one-year 
tables are based on annual averages taken from OECD, OECD 
Employment Outlook, several years. There are no two-years tables. 
Series for three-months and one-year tables run from 1975 to 1984 and 
are complete. the earliest six-months table has 1977 as starting date. 
Number of tables 10, 7, 10, 0 (27). 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Data for three-months, six-months and one-year tabes are from 
Department of Employment, Department of Employment Gazette, 
several years. All tables have October as a starting date. These three 
series are complete. Data are administrative. The first four tables of a 
series do not pertain to the United Kingdom, but to Great Britain. 
There are five two-years tables, the earliest one having October 1978 
as starting date, the latest one having October 1982 as starting date. 
Data for these tables were taken from Eurostat, Employment and 
Unemployment 1986. Number of tables: 10, 10, 10, 5 (35). 
UNITED STATES 
Data were taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, several years. Data are from labor 
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force surveys. All tables have October as starting date. Earliest tables 
having 1974 as starting date, latest 1984. There are no two-years tables, 
other series are complete. Number of tables: 10, 10, 10, 0 (30). 
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